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The  purpose  of  this  study of the Ku Klux Klan  in 
Buffalo, New York,  was to   examine the movement in a limited 
context   in order to provide evidence for broader characteris- 
tics  of  the  movement   and  to  indicate  any unique  qualities. 
One  of the most  extensive   local Klan membership lists 
available afforded an opportunity to determine which groups 
were more  inclined to   join the movement and the determinants 
involved  in  an  individual's  commitment. 
The typical Buffalo Klansman was a blue-collar worker 
who  lived near an ethnic  concentration or knew someone who 
did.     He  was  a prohibitionist  whose  beliefs v/ere   re-enforced 
by the   sermons he heard in   church.     And finally,   he was an 
average   citizen who perceived immigrant union and political 
activity in conspiratorial  terms. 
In addition to  providing an opportunity to determine 
the   class characteristics  of those most  susceptible to Klan 
propaganda,   the  study also  allowed an examination of the 
interrelationships between the Klan,   the Anti-Saloon League 
and the Protestant  churches.     The  impact  of the press and 
those  in positions of influence or authority on the dynamic 
processes involved in the Klan's rise and fall is also 
considered.     Moreover,   as a fraternal organization,  the 
Buffalo Klan was more typical of the countless local Klans 
across the  country which have received less attention than 
their more notable   counterparts  in the south and west. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Ku Klux Elan of the 1920's was not an aberration 
in this nation's experience but another of the numerous 
movements which reacted to a subversive stereotype.  Those 
Americans involved in the Salem witch hunt, the Know-Nothing 
Party, the Reconstruction Klan, the American Protective 
Association, and even the McCarthy crusade of the 1950*s 
reacted to different circumstances, yet they exhibited com- 
mon characteristics.  Pear of cosmopolitanism and diversity, 
a desire for public morality, and a sincere, although dis- 
torted belief that society's survival was threatened, convinced 
the participants on each occasion that it was their civic duty 
to defend and preserve the status quo. 
Such concerns were particularly prevalent in the 
early twentieth century when intellectual trends and social 
forces contributed to intense nativism and a desire for con- 
formity. Recent immigrants differed in language, customs, 
religion, educational experience, and cultural background 
from their predecessors.  The tensions generated by World 
War I spy hunts, the Red Scare, and violent labor disputes, 
inflated public fears, creating a belief that the immigrant 
was a threat to public morality , Anglo-conformity, and 
democracy. A vast number of organizations responded to the 
emerging immigrant-radical stereotype.  The American Legion 
and the Anti-Saloon League as well as local Protestant and 
Americanization groups  called for a moral  resurgence   of 
American  life,   Anglo-conformity and  immigration  restrictions. 
None was more  insistent than the Elan. 
Although  numerous  studies  of  the  Klar   exist,   few 
analyze the  characteristics   of individual members such as 
their occupational or  class traits,   although membership 
lists exist  for some areas.     This omission is  in part,   of 
course,   a result   of inadequate  evidence.     Secrecy was both 
a strong element   in the organization's appeal and a deliberate 
attempt to   shield the hierarchial leadership from public 
scrutiny and accountability to the membership.     Even though 
Buffalo's Provisional Klan Number 5  guarded its privacy,  an 
available  membership  list   complete  with names,   addresses and 
occupations  affords  a unique   opportunity   to   penetrate   that 
veil of secrecy and determine which groups were more  inclined 
to   join the  Klan  and what  determinants were   involved  in  an 
individual's   commitment.     The  brevity  of  the  Klan's activity 
in Buffalo   from  1922  to  1924   facilitates  a  detailed  examina- 
tion  of the   dynamic processes   involved  in   its  rise  and  fall, 
the   impact  of leadership on tactics,   and the role  of the 
press and other  community institutions on the Klan's growth 
and decline.     And possibly most  important,   an examination of 
the Buffalo Klan affords an  opportunity to  study a predomi- 
nately fraternal Klan in a northern urban environment. 
CHAPTER I 
"THE TIME IS RIPE" 
Although William Simmons founded the Knights of the 
Ku Klux Klan in 1915, the order remained relatively insig- 
ficant until World War I released previously latent sources 
of societal strain. National tensions which developed during 
the war and the postwar hysteria predisposed many to perceive 
certain groups and events in conspiratorial terms.  Strikes 
and union activity became synonymous with Communist attempts 
to subvert free enterprise, Jews became wealthy bankers and 
businessmen who exploited the public, and Catholic priests 
became papal agents dedicated to establishing a state religion 
By the same token, blacks were viewed as "uppity niggers" 
who forgot their place in society or, worse still, sexual 
threats.  And the new immigrants became radical Bolsheviks 
who refused to assimilate into American society. Playing on 
these fears, Klan organizers visited rural areas, towns and 
cities and skillfully applied the dictates of national Klan 
propagandists, Elizabeth Tyler and Edward Clarke, who urged 
them to appeal to local issues in search of new recruits. 
Local conditions in Buffalo, New York, aided Klan 
organizers. The residential patterns and growth of parallel 
social and economic institutions in the Polish and Italian 
communities convinced many whites that the immigrants refused 
to accept American customs.  Two violent labor disputes 
involving large numbers of first- and  second-generation 
Polish-Americans  intensified the public's fear of the  aliens. 
The  election of a "wet" mayor in 1921 with considerable  immi- 
grant   support   convinced man;/  that  the   aliens not   only  refused 
to assimilate  but   desired to   change American  customs.     A 
subsequent   vice  and liquor  scandal   in  a black-Polish   slum 
made   it  painfully  obvious  that  action was necessary  to  preserve 
American society from what Madison Grant  called the "mongreli- 
zation of the  white  race."    More  important to the Klar.'s 
success than the public's perception of the  immigrant-radical 
threat was the   existence  of community groups which saw their 
task as combating evil influences and protecting American 
values.     In short,   local determinants   convinced Klan 
organizers that many potential   converts lived in the area. 
Local   conditions  also   limited  the  Klan's  choice  of 
enemies.     Only   5.68 per cent  of Buffalo's  351,907  inhabitants 
were Jewish and only 0.89 per cent were black.     Although 
Roman   Catholics comprised 63.58 per cent  of the population 
in 1920, Catholics first  arrived in the area among the 
easily assimilable   Irish and German immigrants  in the  early 
and midnineteenth century.     The new Catholic  immigrants 
who arrived after i860 were no  longer of Anglo-Saxon or 
northern European stock but from eastern and southern 
Europe.    Moreover,   they spoke neither English nor German 
but Polish,   Russian,   Hungarian or Italian.     Predominately 
from small rural villages where the  church was an active 
cohesive force, they still looked to their priests for 
guidance.  In short, they were different in language, 
religiosity, customs, political ideas, and behavior from 
their predecessors. 
The relative size of the new immigrant communities 
decreased between 1900 and 1920.  Foreign-born whites 
constituted 29.58 per cent of the city's population in 1900 
but only 23.98 per cent in 1920.  A similar trend was evident 
among white natives of foreign or mixed parentage (44.18 per 
cent in 1900 and 42.49 per cent in 1920.) The number of 
native Poles reached a peak of 6.94 per cent in 1910 and 
declined to 6.70 per cent in 1920.  Only the Italians 
(3.23 per cent in 1920) and the blacks showed any consistent 
increase during the period.1 
The emerging parallel social, cultural, and economic 
institutions in the ethnic communities which catered to the 
immigrants and allowed them to remain isolated, generated 
greater concern than the communities' size. The Broadway- 
Fillmore section of Polonia where the clerks were bilingual 
or spoke only Polish, rivaled the downtown business section 
in the number and variety of stores. Area merchants who 
founded the Polish Businessmen's Association to strengthen 
1\J.   S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
Twelfth Census of the United States. 1900: Population, I, 
Part 1, 630; Fourteenth Census of the United States. 1920; 
Population. TtTr 76M-70q. "MB; Census of Religious Bodies; 
1926. I. 381-382. 
their economic condition, held numerous meetings and social 
events, contributed to area charities, and encouraged the 
establishment of other businesses. The Polish-National 
Alliance, Polish Union of America, and Polish Roman Catholic 
Union of America, sold family insurance policies while the 
Alliance of Polish Women in America had a more limited 
appeal.  Six parochial schools offered an alternative to 
public education, teaching Polish history, culture, and 
language, while the Polish Literary Circle and Polish Union's 
library attempted to instill old-world traditions in those 
attending public schools.  The Central Committee of Allied 
Societies and Organizations, founded in 1922, coordinated 
activities among the numerous dramatic, singing and literary 
societies and urged Polish-Americans to increase their power 
in local, state and national elections.  The parishioners 
of Saint Stanislaus Church and Saint Adalbert's Basilica 
purchased cemeteries to retain the community's cohesiveness 
in the next world as well.^ 
^Por information on the Polish section of Buffalo, 
see a series of articles by John Daniels, Director of the 
Buffalo Social Survey, in the Buffalo Express; January 23» 
1910; February 6 and 20, 1910; March 3 and 10, 1910, and 
April 6 and 17, 1910.  Also examine the parish history 
sections in the following anniversary albums: Album Pamiatkowe 
Zlotefco Jubileuszu Parafji Sw. Mojciecna, B.M.~T866-193G 
(Buffalo, 1936); Ksie,";a Pamiatkowa. Zlotc-qo Jubileuszu Osady 
Polskie.j i Paraf.ji Sw. Stanislawa B. i K. 1873-1923 (Buffalo: 
1924J; Pamictniic Zlotego Jubileuszu Paraf.ji Przemienienia 
Panskie'go 1693-1,943 (Buffalo: 1943); Queen of Peace, Buffalo, 
N. Y. 1020-1970 "[Buffalo: 1970).  Buffalo and Erie County 
Public Library, Buffalo's Foreign Population Vol. II, 
(Newspaper Clipping Scrapbook). 
Conditions in "Little Italy" were very similar. 
Most Italians arrived after 1900 and found employment in 
the building trades.  Some, however, continued to practice 
old-world crafts; others became vegetable pushcart peddlers 
while some resumed village customs and raised goats in their 
yards.  The San Domata Mutual Aid Society, Sanfele Mutual 
Aid Society, and Dante Aleghaeri Club offered companionship 
and attempted to place newly arrived Italians in an apartment 
and a job.  Area merchants established a business association 
and labor elements organized a union. The Club Parochiale 
di St. Antonio acted as a central cohesive force, promoting 
educational, spiritual, economic and social activities.3 
The cohesiveness of the ethnic communities acted as 
a necessary psychological crutch for the displaced immigrant, 
providing a refuge rather than attempting to change his 
behavior patterns.  Torn away from his native village and 
often his family, unemployed and penniless, and in a strange 
environment where he had difficulty being understood, he 
chose to live with "his people." Although he was crowded 
with them into inadequate housing, the smell of native 
30ee the Buffalo Courier, January 15, 1922, p. 10; 
and the local history section in Chiesa di St. Antonio da 
Padova. 1891-1921 (Buffalo: 1QP1 1. n. 4: Buffalo Foreign 
Population, Vol. I 
cooking,   sound of native music,   and the   sight   of old-world 
festivities,   made his transition into American society less 
traumatic. 
As early as 1898,   the Buffalo Chapter of the 
Daughters of the American Revolution demonstrated its  deter- 
mination to integrate  the  immigrant  into American society. 
It  prepared a series  of foreign-language  lecturers on 
American history and government  to assist those applying 
for   citizenship.     Concerned  citizens   in New York  City 
founded the North American Civic League  in 1909 to lobby 
for a state-financed Americanization program and support 
local   educational  programs.     A night   education  course 
designed  to  prepare  aliens  for  citizenship was  the   core  of 
Buffalo's official attempt  to assimilate  the aliens.-1 
Success,   however,  was   limited.     In 1930,   16.9 per cent  of 
Buffalo's  Italian population and 17.6 per cent  of the Poles 
over  ten  years   of  age   were  unable  to   speak English. 
Ethnic   cohesiveness  did not   cause  the  emotional 
response  precipitated  by  immigrant  union  activity.     Many 
^Por  information  concerning the   effects  of  ethnic 
concentrations  on immigrants,   see:   Oscar Handlin,  The 
Uprooted  (Boston:   Little,   Brown  and  Company,   1951);   John 
Hicham,   Strangers   in  the  Land   (New Brunswick:   Rutgers  Univer- 
sity Press,   1955),   pp.   Z3&   ±'.i   and Milton  Gordon,   Assimilation 
in American  Life   (New  York:   Oxford  University Press,  1964). 
^Higham,   pp.   237,   240-241;   Buffalo Express.   January 
1,   1922,   sec.   6,   p.   1. 
6Stanley  Lieberson,   Ethnic Patterns  in  American  Cities 
(New  York:   The  Free Press,   1963),   pp.   210-211.The  non-English 
speaking element   among  Italians  and Poles was more  than  three 
times that of any other group. 
Buffalonians attributed prewar unionization to the activity 
of the International Workers of the World (IWW).  Although a 
hard core of 500 Marxist Socialists held weekly meetings in 
predominately immigrant areas and published a newspaper, 
Die Arbieter Zeitung, the IWW engaged in strike coordination 
only during the 1913 streetcar strike.  Its verbal support 
of nearly eighty strikes in the prewar years, however, con- 
vinced many people that the IWW was creating a permanent 
state of industrial chaos.' 
World War I brought a respite from strikes but 
postwar inflation and increased union frustration over working 
conditions precipitated a labor confrontation in 1919-  The 
National Committee for Organizing Iron and Steel Workers was 
especially successful among immigrant steel workers in the 
South Buffalo and Lackawanna mills.  Supported mostly by 
unskilled laborers who worked seventy hours per week for 
$28, the union demanded better wages, working conditions 
and company housing, and shorter hours. Although the strikers 
comprised only 15 per cent of the labor force, their threats 
of physical violence convined 60 per cent of the employees 
to remain at home.  Clashes erupted between strikers and non- 
union employees reporting for work under police protection. 
p. 39. 
10 
Pour workers died and hundreds were injured. State police 
and armed troops restored order after two weeks of martial 
law.8 
The press was unanimous in its condemnation of the 
strikers and depicted recent immigrants in a stereotypic 
manner later adopted by the Klan.  The ultraconservative 
Commercial characterized the strikers as Bolsheviks who 
refused to educate their "children according to American 
standards or to purchase homes in the community."^  Union 
success in the steel industry would establish a dangerous 
precedent that would quickly spread to other industries, 
crippling free enterprise.  Through the unions, the paper 
charged, radicals attempted to overthrow the government 
and perpetuate a continuous state of industrial chaos. 
The Catholic Union and Times supported the laborers' right 
to strike but condemned the violent tactics of "Socialists 
who attempted to create the impression among workers that 
they were at war with their employers. ,11 The moderate 
8Robert Murray, Red Scare (Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1955;, P- 137; Buffalo Express, Septem- 
ber 23, 1919, to October 10, 1919. 
^Buffalo Commercial, September 20, 1919, P- 4. 
10Ibid.  January 6, 1920, p. 4 
11Catholic Union and Times, September 25, 1919, p. 4. 
11 
Evening News  blamed the   strikers  for  initiating the violence 
and charged the union with the responsibility "to   prevent 
the conditions which lead up to clashes,   or disorder." 
The  emotional  reaction to the  strikes  coincided with 
a national belief that  all strikes were  inherently "crimes 
against   society,   conspiracies  against  the  government,   or 
plots to establish Communism."     Attorney General A. Mitchell 
Palmer's national  hunt   for radicals  was,   in  part,   a reaction 
to that   fear.     One hundred and twenty-nine socially prominent 
Buffalonians  reacted  to  Palmer's  emotion-charged  rhetoric 
and assisted federal agents  in the arrest of 139 suspected 
radicals  in  January 1920.     Their reaction to   a  demagogic 
appeal was an indication of how deeply they feared  domestic 
radicals and their willingness to participate   in acts 
aimed at limiting radical influence.     Their participation 
also indicated that they were willing to  force aliens to 
comply with their view of  proper behavior patterns.     Above 
all  else,   it was a forewarning of future  events. 
If  the  raiders  hoped  their actions would mark the 
end of union radicalism  in Buffalo,   they were   disappointed. 
Although the  International Railway Company, which operated 
12Buffalo  Evening News,   September 24,   1919,   P-   12. 
^Elwin Powell,   The  Design  of Discord   (New  York: 
Oxford  University Press,   1976J,   p.   9b;   Stanley  Coban,   "A 
Study  in Nativism:   The American Red Scare  of 1919-1920, 
Political  Science   Quarterly,   LXXIX,   no.   1   (March 1964), 
PP.   52-75. 
12 
the streetcar system* agreed not to reduce the high level 
of wartime wages until mid-1922, two 10 per cent reductions 
occurred before June 1922.  Car repairmen struck over the 
wage cuts, the absence of a written contract since 1920, 
and union recognition, thus halting all service.  Within a 
few days, cabs, jitneys, and cars operated by strikebreakers, 
restored service to most primary routes.  Strikers and their 
families pelted the operators with rocks and eggs, beat and 
dragged women and children off cars, planted dynamite in 
cars and barns, shot guards and police, and hurled acid, 
blinding at least one strikebreaker.  Six people died, 
hundreds were injured and thousands of dollars of damage 
14 was done to company and private property. 
The bombings, at least, appeared to be part of an 
organized plot. Bombs exploded in the Cold Springs barns 
on July 20 and in a number of cars simultaneously in 
different areas of the city on July 31 and August 12.  The 
police arrested six union officials for transporting and 
supplying the strikers with dynamite. The arrests and 
public fear fueled rumors that the strikers planned to use 
explosives to further disrupt the city. 
The press denounced the violence and expressed 
concern over the participation of Polish immigrants in the 
14Por the most reliable and complete information 
on the strike, see: Buffalo Exuress. July 7, 1922 to 
October 5, 1922. 
13 
union.  The Polish Businessmen's Association's claim that 
the police used "excessive and unnecessary force in cur- 
tailing the violence" clearly placed Polonia's business 
leaders in support of the union. The Express believed 
the strike was a "question of lav/ and order, of the supre- 
macy of government over the individual, of the rights of 
organized society against the reactionary, barbarian 
15 instinct for disorganization and destruction." 
In addition to union activity, immigrant political 
power stirred images of destruction in the minds of many 
people, increasing social polarization—a prerequisite for 
public susceptibility to Klan propaganda. The 1921 mayoralty 
election between incumbent Mayor George Buck and former 
brewery manager Prank X.Schwab, both Independent Republicans, 
was a symbolic struggle between the traditional Protestant 
establishment allied with older immigrant groups against 
newer immigrant groups in the southern half of the city. 
Schwab addressed small gatherings on street corners and in 
meetings at the Jewish Community Hall, Polish Union Hall 
and Afro-American Social Club.  In addition to a modifica- 
tion of the prohibition laws and an affirmation of civic 
decency and fatherhood, he supported economy and efficiency 
^Buffalo Express. July 21, 1922, p. 6. 
l6BuffaloCommercial, October 19, 1921, 4. The 
Commercial was the most outspoken proponent of this view 
but not the sole believer. 
14 
in  civic  administration,   relief  for the  unemployed,   and 
greater personal liberty.   He promised to  reorganize the 
Police Department,   abolish the Buffalo Dry Squad which 
enforced the Volstead Act,   create harmony within the 
faction-laden  City  Council,   and dismiss  School  Board 
members who opposed his plans for the   construction of 
17 vocational schools  in immigrant areas. 
Ignoring Schwab's other appeals,   Mayor Buck con- 
centrated his  campaign attacks against his opponent's 
prohibition plank.     Buck warned that the   city's reputation 
as a progressive law-abiding community would decline  if a 
"wet"   candidate  won.     He  branded Schwab  as a lobbyist  who 
represented only a small minority of the   city's population 
and repeatedly  charged that   Schwab appealed to  racial 
prejudice  and  fostered "disunion,   factionalism  and  disrtip- 
tion."18 
17Buffalo  Express,   October  25,   1S21,   to November 4, 
1921.     Schwab's   ooposition  to  the Volstead Act   can  be 
attributed to  two factors.     Publically,   he  said the law 
failed to   end the production of alcoholic beverages since 
normally lawful citizens produced their own. c°nC0£*J°;"?e, v 
at home where  their  children could sample   them.     rrivaxeiy, 
he knew that he  stood to gain financially from the reopening 
of the Buffalo Brewing Company where he was a manager.     In 
June  of 1922,   he was fined $500 for the  production of beer 
in the plant after the Volstead Act became effective. 
l8Ibid.     October 28,   1921,   p.   4.     Buck's repeated 
referencesTTthe  city's east-west   split  and his anti- 
immigrant   speeches intensified social tensions. 
15 
Prohibitionists and the press  joined Buck in his 
battle.     William Anderson,   State  Superintendent   of the 
Anti-Saloon League,   asserted  that  law  enforcement,   personal 
decency,   and honesty were   crucial  campaign issues.     He 
questioned Schwab's integrity and accused him of attempting 
to deceive the  "voters,   some   of them ignorant and not any 
too  well  aco.uainted with either  our  language  or  our  insti- 
tutions."19    Charles C.  Penfold,   pastor of the  Sentinel 
Methodist   Episcopal  Church,   called  on  his  congregation to 
20 
vote   for a "dry"   candidate and "clean government."   '     The 
Lxoress accused Schwab  of relying on thousands of home 
brewers to elect him on a prohibition plank which he  could 
not   fulfill,   while  the  Evening Hews  believed that  Schwab 
would win only if those who believed in good government 
remained apathetic and failed to vote.21    The Commercial 
warned that Schwab's  election would be a "public calamity" 
brought  on by "elements  that  do  not  appreciate  the  value 
of their citizenship,   that have no   civic pride that 
would be among the first to respond to the  call of the 
22 
radical and the Bolshevist to riot and destroy." 
19Buffalo   Express,   October  27,   1921,   p.   1. 
20Ibid.     November 3,   1921,   p.   8. 
21Ibid.     November 4,   1921,   8;   Buffalo  Evening 
News,   November 7,   1921,   p.   8. 
22B»ffain   Commercial,   November 4,   1921,   p.   4. 
16 
Over 50 per cent of the voters failed to heed the 
warning and voted for Frank Schwab.  For man;', it was 
obvious which group provided the slin-winning margin.  A 
comparison of the ward returns with the number of potential 
voters indicates that in areas of high ethnic concentra- 
tions, Schwab was more likely to receive a majority. 
Schwab lost in the twenty-third and twenty-fifth v/ards 
where the number of white natives of native parentage 
exceeded the combined total of all other groups.  He v/on 
handsomely in the ninth and tenth v/ards, predominately 
newer immigrant areas.  Although this trend is not evident 
in each instance, it is partially indicative of who supported 
each candidate.    Ethnic elements proved to be the critical 
determinant in the election.  Projecting their fears, many 
of Buck's supporters would blame the aliens for the con- 
sequences. 
^Buffalo Express, November 9, 1921, p. 1. 
See Table 1 and Figure 1.  Voter registration figures, 
if they existed for 1921, would not indicate the respective 
electoral strength of the various groups in a ward. The 
potential voter strength indicated in Table 1 should not 
be confused with the number of registered voters.  It is 
only an indication of the composition of the wards. 
Fourteenth Census of the United States. 1920; Population. 
Ill, 706-709.  The trend is not as evident in a few wards. 
In the fifth, thirteenth, sixteenth and twenty-first wards, 
a higher proportion of registered voters among white 
natives with native parentage could account for the dis- 
crepancy.  In addition, mobilization of the electorate in 
those wards by the Anti-Saloon League and various church 
organizations may have been a factor. 
TABLE 1 
1921 Ward Election Results Compared 
to Potential Voter Registration 
17 
Wards WN-NP WN-FMP FB Black S chwab Buck 
21+ 21+ Naturalized 
21+ 
21+ Vote Vote 
1 1948 3517 1714 ___ 2706 960 
2 1825 1795 1737 203 1212 413 
3 1399 1840 1353 53 1219 527 
4 2680 2332 1112 2 1674 1140 
5 4649 5798 2509 3 3846 3386 
6 2013 2117 1146 1525 1844 594 
7 1269 2109 1721 864 1575 723 
8 1984 3210 1756 71 1862 1117 
9 517 2597 1786 23 1367 504 
10 75 3155 2814 2 2176 434 
11 1817 3965 2849 9 2547 1215 
12 2203 3063 1069 1 1910 1223 
13 2101 4250 1288 6 1953 1675 
14 2165 3784 1850 143 2358 1185 
15 1206 4678 3308 2 2898 984 
16 2029 5404 2454 8 1916 1518 
17 5207 6033 3295 172 2846 3697 
18 4720 6380 2374 29 3132 3969 
19 3634 6835 3590 18 3453 2452 
20 10387 9588 3544 63 4392 8109 
21 3726 5056 3474 4 2847 3047 
22 3064 4897 3001 28 2230 3717 
23 8000 5274 2242 26 1740 6365 
24 5381 4760 2155 46 2621 3433 
25 7377 4432 1621 61 1666 4574 
26 2899 2932 2844 34 1970 1367 
27 2926 2225 2469 14 1571 1046 c—  1 
62531 59974 
Key: 
WN-NB  21+ 
WN-FMP  21+ 
FB-Naturalized  21+ 
Black  21+ 
= White  natives-native  parents,   21+  years 
= White  natives-foreign  or mixed 
parents,   21+ years 
=  Foreign-born,   naturalized  citizens, 
21+ years 
= Blacks,  21+ years. 
Figure 1 





For those who perceived Schwab as a special-interest 
lobbyist  relying on radical support,   it was relatively easy 
to foresee the  election's  implications.     Although the foreign- 
born  population was  declining in relative  numbers,   previous 
arrivals  supported and elected a mayor who expressed their 
aspirations.     The   election marked not  only the  beginning of 
the  immigrants'   willingness to use the political processes 
but the  end of the exclusive control over local politics 
previously held by the  city's Anglo-Saxon and northern 
European stock.     In addition, many feared it marked the 
beginning of  a  change   in public morality,   for with  Schwab 
in  office,   liquor and vice  would abound   in the  city.     They 
soon believed their worst apprehensions were   justified. 
Buffalo's  strategic location on the Canadian border 
made  "rum running"  along the Niagara River profitable and 
relatively free of government harassment.     Canadian officials 
notified American agents upon the  departure  of  craft  laden 
with beer  and  liquor  but  since  the  time  required  to  cross 
the river and unload the  contraband often tool: less than 
thirty minutes,  American officials made few arrests.     Impor- 
tation augmented local  clandestine production.     Arrests for 
public intoxication,  which declined from 13,315 in 1916 to 
8,853 in 1919,   rose to  over 10,000 in 1923 and remained 
constant  for a decade. 24 
24Buffalo Police Department,   Reports,   1915-1933- 
20 
Although  the  extent   of  prohibition violations  did 
not  actually   increase after Schwab assumed office   in January 
1922,   the public's perception of the  problem did.     Before 
May of 1922,   newspaper reports on violations appeared on 
back  pages in  small articles thereby creating the   impression 
of relative unimportance.     On Kay 1,   1922,   the psychological 
impact   of  the   reports  changed  substantially when  the Excress 
published the  first of a six-installment,   feature-length, 
front-page  series  on conditions  in a black-Polish slam near 
downtown Buffalo.     A reporter discovered flagrant   prohibition 
violations in the   four  incorporated social and gymnastic 
clubs he visited.     Members,   businessmen,   and curious young 
couples purchased whiskey,   gin,   sherry,  port,   apricot 
cocktails,   and home brew.     Drunks cluttered the  streets 
and  alleys  otitside   the   clubs  while  "evil  women,   quite 
friendly even to total  strangers"  plied their trade inside. 
Two mulatto dancers shocked the  reporter who  called their 
lewd exhibition "the most nauseating spectacle to  a sober 
mind possessed of a slight  degree of civilization and 
refinement."     A uniformed police  officer,   who  entered  one   club 
for a  drink,   made  no attempt   to  arrest  anyone  present  since 
he was a member.     Most  patrons were characterized as 
'depraved individuals"  with  "drink-sodden senses. 
„25 
25TWfH1o  Express,  May 1  to  6,   1922. 
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The articles   implied a more  sinister regular patron. 
Two  of  the   city's  twenty  incorporated  clubs were  "Negro 
clubs" while many others had ethnic names.    The Roma Club's 
charter stated  its goal was to "encourage,   promote  and 
cultivate  the   social relations among the members of the 
society and to  extend the benefit of fraternal intercourse 
among the  Italian citizens of Buffalo."        Mulatto  dancers, 
black musicians and waitresses "thoroughly dressed from the 
chin up"   entertained and served patrons. 
Many people believed Schwab allowed these   conditions 
to develop to  reward his supporters.     They perceived the 
mayor's reservations  concerning the legality of closing the 
private  clubs as a refusal to  enforce the laws. The mayor, 
however,  was not  so lax as his detractors believed.     He 
promptly stationed police officers outside the   clubs to 
check membership  cards and discourage the   curious from 
entering.     The   deterence resulted in a swift decline  in 
business and the  closing of three clubs. 
But   critics of the mayor were not  satisfied by such 
acts.     The Anti-Saloon League and five fundamentalist 
26 Buffi ilo Express, May 6, 1922, p. 7 
27Schwab proposed a licensing system in March which 
cancel it- license.  The enforcement procedures in the system 
were extremely vague and when the "ece^^ legislation ln- 
passcd by the Common Council in July, the system proved m 
effective. 
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Protestant ministers mobilized public opinion and founded 
neighborhood organizations concerned with what they perceived 
as Buffalo's moral decay.  Skeptical of Schwab's promises to 
enforce the prohibition laws, William Anderson favored a 
citizen's campaign to sensitize the public with the Anti- 
Saloon League coordinating activities among various local 
organizations which in turn v/ould pressure the police into 
enforcing the laws.   Accordingly, a number of ministers 
established committees within their churches to investigate 
local conditions and publicize their findings.  In addition, 
each minister emphasized vice conditions and prohibition 
violations in sermons, criticized the mayor and blamed 
Schwab and his supporters for local immorality.  Charles Pen- 
fold of the Sentinel Methodist Episcopal Church repeatedly 
referred to the rampant vice on the west side [he   implied 
the Italian community] while Littleton E. H. Smith of the 
Ontario Street Presbyterian Church criticized Schwab for 
29 
his selective enforcement of laws. 
The zeal of the Crusading Ministers and their funda- 
mentalist followers was more than a simple expression of 
28Buffalo Jxnress, January 1, 1922, p. 7. 
29other committees were founded by Robert J. 
MaoAluine of the Central Presbyterian Church, Robert T. Doherty 
of Se Soodsile EetSodiBt Episcopal Church, and Chester Coward- 
line of the Ontario Street Methodist Episcopal Cnurch. 
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civic  duty.     Immigrant  political  and  economic  assertiveness 
was  viev/ed as  a  corruption  of nineteenth-century America's 
socio-economic   structure  and  a threat   to  Christian  society. 
Alien  control   of City Hall   led to   increased  public  immorality 
which was  viev/ed  as  an  indication that  modernism was   infect- 
ing the   social fabric.    To  fundamentalists,  modernism meant 
a decline  in church influence,   a breakdown of parental 
control,   and a looser personal  code marked by a change in 
sexual patterns,   drinking,   smoking,   dancing,   and short 
skirts.30 
The Buffalo press supported the view that modernism 
was indeed having a deletorious effect.     When the Erie 
County Health Commissioner attributed a marked decline  in 
Buffalo's  birth rate  during the first quarter of 1922 to 
improved and,   incidentally,   "illegal and immoral"  birth 
control devices,  his views were duly reported to the news- 
paper-reading public.31    The  sermons of Reverend Doctor J. 
Prank Norris also received considerable attention in the 
Express.     Blaming short skirts,   eyelashes,   and nude hosiery 
for a breakdown  in family life and respect for the law,  the 
"Texas Tornado,"  as he was  called,   predicted divine wrath in 
30David Danzig,   "The Radical Right and the Rise of 
the  Fundamentalist Minority,"   Commentary,   XXXIII^ no.   4 
(April 1962),   p.   292;   Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, 
The  Politics  of  Unreason  (New  York:   Harper and Row, 
Publishers,  1970;,   pp. 115-1171   131-132. 
3lBnffalo  Express,   April  9,   1922,   sec.   5,   ?.   3- 
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the form of war if moral decency continued to  decline. 
The automobile,  however,   was the v/orst  offender.     A "red 
light   district on rubber  tires,"   it  allowed  young 
couples greater mobility and a means to  escape  the watchful 
eyes of parents. 
Responding to Norris'   warnings,   Smith and the other 
"crusading ministers" attempted to  control youthful exuber- 
ance   in public dance halls where young men arrived with hip 
flasks and left with flappers  on their way to lonely roads 
and "petting parties."     Indeed,   it was in the  dance halls 
where the fundamentalists saw the most dangerous effects of 
Schwab's permissiveness for liquor and sexual temptation 
symbolized all that was  evil and destructive  in society. 
For such men, Eayor Schwab and his supporters were more than 
symbols of society's ills;  by  projection,   they were the 
cause. 
When Klan organizers arrived in Buffalo,   they found 
a target which was widely accepted by many as the cause of 
public  immorality.     "Wets" and immigrants were  enemies which 
easily fitted into  the Klan fundamentalist-nativist  ideology. 
The   local   context—immigrant   participation  in violent   strikes, 
the  election  of a "wet"   candidate,   and public sensitivity to 
prohibition violations and vice-provided a fertile  seedbed 
in which the Klan could grow.   Many people were already 
32Bl1ffalo  BxgreeB,   April  2,   1922,   sec.   4,   p.   1. 
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participating in organizations to control social behavior, 
discredit the mayor and regain control of city hall.  Basic 
organizational recruiting to achieve those goals had begun 
even before Klan organizers arrived in the "City of Good 
Neighbors." 
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CHAPTER  II 
THE KLAN  ACTS 
Provisional Klan Number Five attempted to accomplish 
two interrelated goals:   to end vice and prohibition viola- 
tions   in the   city and to  sensitize the public to what  it 
perceived as Schwab's lack of moral leadership.     Initially, 
Klan leaders  chose persuasive tactics.     A year passed,  mem- 
bership grew,   and yet the Klan accomplished little.    Pros- 
titutes roamed the  streets and liquor was readily available 
in  social  clubs and bars.     The  Klan's  failure  to  achieve 
massive support,   increasing public criticism,  and growing 
public apathy to the immigrant-radical  stereotype,   convinced 
some  loaders and members that more forceful,   coercive tactics 
were necessary to   "clean up" Buffalo.    The  change  in tactics 
achieved little except to further alienate the press and to 
foster a split among the  "crusading ministers" who previously 
supported Klan ideals.     The fraternal order (turned law 
enforcer) began to falter even before public reaction to 
its only violent act marked its demise. 
Public susceptibility to Klan propaganda in 1922 
made  local  organizers  dream  of  almost  unlimited  growth. 
District Kleagle Mitchell announced a membership drive 
three weeks after the  initial publication of the Express 
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expose* since "the time was ripe."-1- Although the Klan held 
biweekly meetings during the previous nine months, the 
hundreds of local members were insufficient to warrant a 
national charter.  Hoping to remedy this situation, Mitchell 
denied the Klan opposed any group and affirmed its support 
of white supremacy, a free press, separation of Church and 
State, free public schools, and law and order.  Additional 
assistance was forthcoming from State Kleagle Major E. D. 
Smith, who, posing as an Army recruiting officer, visited 
p 
Buffalo in early September. 
As elsewhere in the country, prohibition enforcement 
was the primary appeal utilized in the New York and Ontario 
(Canada) recruitment campaigns.  Reverend Doctor Oscar 
Haywood, a national Klan lecturer, visited Buffalo and stated 
that Klan leaders were "in general sympathy with the Eighteenth 
Amendment suppression of liquor traffic and enforce- 
ment of the Volstead Act. "3 Klan Number Five actively sup- 
ported these goals as an Express reported learned when he 
attended a Klan initiation. Picked up in a car, blindfolded, 
and whisked away to a secret ceremonial ring, he v/as told 
by Klansmen that any white native, Protestant Gentile, who 
supported public schools, Americanism and prohibition, 
could join.  Locally, the Klan supported strict enforcement 
lBnffalo Express, May 23, 1922, p. 1. 
2lbid.  November 30, 1922, p. 1. 
3lbid.  November 27, 1922, p. 1. 
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of the Volstead Act and demanded that  Governor Alfred E. 
Smith veto the repeal of the Mullan-Gage Act.^ 
During this  formative   stage,   the Klan used a number 
of  expressive   tactics to   dramatize   its  presence,   convince 
the   public  of  its   admirable   intentions,   and  create  a  sense 
of common experience among its members.     Cross burnings in 
the   city,   suburbs,   and on Grand Island in the Niagara River, 
and public initiations attracted the  curious from the imme- 
diate area as well as the  press.     Charitable contributions 
were used here as  elsewhere  in an effort to re-enforce an 
image  of benevolence.     In March 1923,   for example, hooded 
Klansmen entered the Kenmore Presbyterian Church,   interrupted 
the  sermon,   read a letter declaring their devotion to Chris- 
tianity and prohibition,   and left  a donation.5    More than a 
year later,   eight members visited the Protestant  Home  for 
Unprotected Children.    They sang a few religious hymns and 
talked to the   children before   leaving a "purse of gold." 
To  promote the  organization and defend it from charger of 
violence and nativism,  national Klan lecturers were brought 
Buffalo  Express,   Kay  28,   1923,   p.   3.     The Mullan- 
Gage Act was a New   TorE law passed to  implement   state 
enforcement   of  the  Volstead Act. 
5lbid.     March 26,   1923,   p.   1-     This  technique  was 
used by loTal Klans  everywhere.    The money was normally 
collected on a regular basis at Klan meetings. 
6Buffalo Commercial,   Julj' 11,   1924,   p.   10. 
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in who  compared the Elan's  exclusion of Catholics,   Jews 
and blacks to the established membership requirements of 
the Masons and other fraternal organizations. 
But  burning crosses and filling collection plates 
were not  enough.     By early 1924,  Buffalo Klansmen would 
resort  to forceful tactics to  sensitize the public to the 
city's moral problems and the need for strict enforcement 
of the  prohibition laws.    Beginning in March,  the Klan 
staged a series  of raids occupying roadhouses and  intimidating 
the  owners and patrons,   thus convincing some "wets"  that 
further violations would result   in violence.     These weekly 
raids were abandoned,   however,   when a few recalcitrant 
violators  stationed armed "guards"  outside the  premises.7 
The   change  in tactics was partially due to a failure 
to achieve  support from those  in positions of authority. 
The Klan failed to enlist more than a dozen clergymen,   a 
few police officers and only one wealthy individual.    More 
importantly,   persuasive  tactics proved ineffective  in 
pressuring the police   or the  mayor  into   increased  law  enforce- 
ment.     The Klan'8 leadership,   especially Littleton E.  H. 
Smith,   believed  that   if  the  Klan  resorted  to   coercion,   the 
police would respond to Klan demands.     Smith was already 
experienced in transforing an investigative body into a 
7,nffa.lo Express, March 19,  1924,   p.   5;  March 23, 
1924,   p.   1;   and March M,  1524,   p.  4. 
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private police force after he was appointed Chairman of the 
Buffalo Council of Churches' Social Services Committee.  He 
and a band of assistants raided bars and prostitutes' houses, 
turning the evidence over to police after notifying the 
press.  During the same period, Smith led hooded Klansmen 
in similar raids. 
The expressive nature of the Klan persisted into his 
new coercive stage.  The raiders notified the press of any 
positive achievements and challenged the mayor and the police 
to follow their example.  Criticism of Mayor Schwab was an 
essential part of the local Klan's propaganda. Believing he 
was addressing a businessmen's meeting in March 1924, the 
mayor was interrupted by fifteen hooded Klansmen who said 
that the "Eighteenth Amendment and the laws against prosti- 
tution were not being enforced in the city."8  Schwab later 
learned that he addressed a Klan-organized meeting. 
Members of the hooded order hoped to achieve more 
than strict enforcement of prohibition through its criticism 
of the mayor.  In late 1924, the Klan issued a statement which 
said, in part, that "The Klan's fight in Buffalo will not 
be fought with bullets but with ballots."9 The statement 
was also indicative of increased political activity in 1924 
SBuffalo Express, March 25, 1924, p. 1. 
9ttiiffaln Commercial. September 15, 1924, p. 10. 
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under  Imperial  Wizard Hiram  Evans.     Furthermore,   the   election 
of a prohibitionist   in 1925 was possible since Schwab won in 
1921 by a slim margin.     If the Klan could convince  the public 
that   the  mayor was   completely  responsible  for  the  city's moral 
decline,   it believed the  goal of a clean city was attainable. 
Public  criticism of the mayor,   acts of charity,  and 
threats  to  roadhouse  owners  which were  never  executed,   were 
all legal,  although the raids did violate the  law's  spirit. 
The  nonviolent   nature  of  the  Buffalo Klan  from  the   time  of 
its  inception to late August  1924  is apparent.     It   complied 
with the  Walker Law's  incorporation  clause  but   refused to 
cease  wearing hoods  or  issue  a  complete membership  list  for 
publication.11     If  it  was  guilty  of any  other  transgressions, 
no record exists.     Only one potentially violent act  was 
attributed to   the  Klan.     Three  unidentified Polish  Catholic 
10 
10Arnold Rice  indicates  in  "The  Southern Wing of the 
Ku Klux Klan  in American Politics"   (unpublished Ph.D.   disser- 
tation,   Stanford University,   I960),   p.   71f,   that local politics 
was the   chief arena of Klan political activity.    National and 
state   politics   and  the Klan's  impact   in  those   areas  received 
more   scholarly  and  contemporary attention  since  local  evidence 
of political influence  is more difficult to find and greater 
importance has   traditionally been accorded to large   elections. 
Although little  evidence  of political activity is available 
in Buffalo,   it  would appear that,   in this respect,   tne 
Buffalo  Klan was  typical  of  local  Klans  in the  South       Also 
see:   David  Chalmers  "The  Ku Klux Klan   in the Politics  in the 
1920's," Mi.».-iH*-im,i Quarterly,  XVIII   (Pall 1965),   PP; 234-47, 
Chalmers,   "The   Ku Klux Klan  in the  Sunshine  State:   The  1920  s, 
Florida Historical  Quarterly XLII   (January  1964),   PP.   209-215. 
and Kenneth Harrell'"The  Ku Klux Klan  m  Louisiana,   1920-1930, 
(unpublished Ph.D.   dissertation,   Louisiana State University, 
1966),   p.   268f. 
llBnffalo Express,   July  11,   1924,   p.   10. 
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priests and members of their parishes received Klan threats 
promising forceable  removal  of the   priests  from Buffalo   if 
they refused to leave voluntarily.     The priests did not 
request  a police   investigation nor were  they  threatened 
12 again. 
Violent   or nonviolent,   the  Klan was  unable  to   shed 
the   image the  organization projected elsewhere.     Public 
criticism of the Klan and its tactics came from religious 
groups   of all  denominations,   the  Polish  community,   and  the 
press.     Rabbi  Louis  J.   Kolald of Temple Beth Zion  spoke  out 
soon  after the  Klan  initiated  its  1922 membership  drive. 
Calling the Klan "a dastardly,  underhanded group of citizens," 
he  denounced  it  as  un-American rather  than  anti-Jewish  or 
anti-Catholic.     The Klan's rise was a temporary result  of 
the unsettling strain that followed World War I,   he  suggested, 
and would come  to naught   in a nation "full of right-minded 
and right-principled people"   who  were   "truly American"   as 
opposed to  those   super patriots  who   parade   "their  Americanism 
under  a  cloak  of Klanism."1^ 
C.   Lukaszykiewicz,   a Polish  playwright,   was  more 
critical  of  those  who  ferreted out  suspicious movements. 
His  play,   entitled  "Ku Klux Klub,"   ridiculed the   secret 
organization and the reporters who overrated the Klan's 
12R,,ffalo Express, November 7,   1922,   p.   1. 
13p„ffn-in  Commercial,   June  2,   1922,   p.   10. 
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power.     In the  play,   Pranck,   a small boy,   sends a letter to 
a man named Brzuchowiak telling him to watch the   janitor 
and organist of his  church.     Pranck signs the note,   "Ku 
Klux Klub."     Trembling with fear,  Brzuchowiak faints  after 
reading the  letter as a group of reporters and publishers 
enter the  room brandishing pencils and pads,   hurriedly 
taking notes.     The papers are full of Klan stories the next 
day.     A few days later,   four hooded Klansmen enter Brzucho- 
wiak' s  room  and  demand  the   letter.     He  refuses and  cries 
out,   "Santa  Claus,   oh,   Santa  Clausl"   for help.     Santa 
dashes  into the room with his reindeer,   tears off the hoods, 
and discovers that the four men are reporters.    V/hen the 
play was performed,   two  federal agents  replaced Santa. 
The  press was less cavalier toward the Klan.   Proud 
of  its   consistent   lav/ and  order  editorial  policy,   the 
Commercial   condemned the Klan's  control  of the Oregon legis- 
lature as representative of midnineteenth century Know- 
Nothingism and a manifestation of all that was un-American 
and undemocratic.1^    The narrow-minded and bigoted  joined 
•^Buffalo Express,   December 15,   1922,   p. 8. 
15B»ffalo  Commercial,   May 22,   1922,   p.   4.     See 






what   in the  final analysis,   the paper believed,  was a 
"vicious,   dangerous and repugnant"  organization,   and hope- 
fully an ephemeral one.     Thriving on racial prejudice and 
emotional frenzy,   it purported to uphold the law which 
it subverted through its actions. The Express  stated 
that   the  "Klan has no capacity  for good"  and predicted that 
its  success would be limited "so long as Americans retain 
17 a semblance of a sense of humanity." Klan activity m 
Oklahoma received considerable attention in the Buffalo 
press.     The  Express  believed  Governor John  C.   V/alton  of 
Oklahoma was opposed by politicians willing to "put the 
machinery  of  government   in  the  hands  of  such  elements  that 
have   little   excuse  for looking down  on the Bolsheviks  of 
Russia."1       As  one  would  expect,   the   ethnic  press  voiced 
its  opposition  in much the  same  rhetoric.     Dziennik  Dla- 
V/szystkich  (Everybody's Daily)   called the  secret  order a 
"group  of organized bandits who act under the   cover of 
patriotism,   brotherhood and charity."     The paper believed 
that   it was  essential for those who opposed the Klan to 
16Buffalo   Commercial,   June  1,   1922,   p.   1. 
1 "^Buffalo Express,   December 5,   1922,   p.   8. 
l8Ibid.     November 2,   1923,   P-   8.     See Charles 
AlpyaniPr.l^ Ku Klux X3*m   ir  the  Southwest     Lexington: 
University of Kentucky i^rcss,   iyop),   pp.  130-133- 
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appeal "to the feeling of justice"   in all Americans and 
not  to   "think  of using un-American tactics  and  force." 
The Buffalo  Volksfreund  echoed the  Dziennik's  opinion. IS 
For others, public criticism of the Klan was a more 
difficult decision. A few days after the Klan interrupted 
Sunday morning services at the Kennore Presbyterian Church, 
the congregation's Christian Endeavor Society disavowed 
any connection with the Klan or any other group which 
excited "religious, ethnic or racial prejudices." The 
society issued another statement five days later, critici- 
zing the interruption of services without mentioning any 
group or event. The society apparently believed it was 
better to accept the Klan's donation and issue a mild 
20 
rebuke without offending the secret order.    Whatever the 
reason, the attitudinal change was indicative of a general 
reluctance by Protestants to assume a clear position 
before 1924. . 
The   direct  action techniques  of  Smith's  Social 
Services Committee and the Klan precipitated a clear break 
1S-n^.-i Bmaj ir  D1 a-Wszvstkich,   November  25,   1922,   p.   4; 
uffalo  Volksfreund,   Noven'beTT^  1922,   p.   4.     The   local 
Ttn-Hsm  ..nnr.   H   Corriere  Italiano,   was  silent  on flan 
activity.     The  paper was prmarily a source of local Italian 
American  activity announcements  and  articles  on  Italian 
political and social developments.     It  did not  publish any 
edltoriaL^nd apparently was  intended as a supplement to 
English language papers rather than a substitute. 
2(Wfalo Express, March 28,   1923,   P.   8;   April 2, 
1923,   p.   4       The  kenmore  Klan  list   contains  only  ten names. 
No   officer  of  the   society  is   l^^J.^^^He   ignored Klan  influence  within the  organization   cannot  be   ignored. 
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among the   previously unanimous  Crusading Ministers.     Robert 
MacAlpine agreed with the Elan's fear of a Vatican threat 
to American democracy but was even more fearful of the Elan's 
21 activity and secrecy. Charles Penfold,  who had been nomi- 
nated for Elan membership but refused, was more explicit. 
Referring to Smith, he said that "Intolerance and bigotry 
are  a menace to free institutions and the man who  cultivates 
them by intemperate of ill-advised speech is a danger to the 
. .      22 community. 
In large   part because of such criticism,   the public, 
by mid-1924,   perceived the Elan as a menace to  societal 
stability.     Pear of the Elan's  coercive tactics and attempts 
to assume the responsibility for law enforcement  displaced 
the  immigrant-radical threat.    More important,  an internal 
debate  over coercive tactxes began to erode the  consensus 
among the Protestant Ministers who favored social  control. 
Many Elansmen began to question the Elan's ideals and 
wondered where the   change in tactics would lead.    Yet the 
allegiance  of the majority of the 4000 local members 
remained steadfast. 
21Buffalo  Express,   June   30,   1924,   p.   5- 
22Ibid.     July 4,   1924,   p.  4. 
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CHAPTER  III 
KLAN MEMBERSHIP AND MOTIVATION 
The  problem  of  determining individual motivation 
defies a precise and complete answer,   especially when one 
is dealing with the members of a social movement.     Despite 
personal differences,   all participants  share  a number of 
common beliefs.     Internal disputes among the membership 
will  occasionally erupt,  yet a degree  of consensus is nor- 
mally maintained.     In order to understand how this consensus 
emerged,   it  is necessary to determine who the members were 
and if they had any common characteristics which made them 
more  susceptible to the propaganda emanating from the move- 
ment.     In short,  what groups were more  inclined to   join the 
Klan in the twenties? 
Kenneth Jackson attempts to answer this question in 
his  study of the urban Klan.1    His occupational analysis of 
small numbers of Klansracn in Chicago,   Aurora,   and Winchester, 
Illinois,   deals with such small  samples that the results 
are,   at best,   of limited importance and,   at worst, 
Kenneth Jackson,  fh« Ku Klux Klar  in the  Citff, 
loiR-iov)   (New   York:   Oxford University Press,   !>&(),   pp. 
ESS?TO) 114,  119-120,   153,   225,  and 242. 
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2 
misleading.       His comparison of residential information for 
Klansmen  in Indianapolis and Denver and their proximity to 
black and ethnic concentrations would reveal more about 
those participants if additional parameters were utilized. 
His profile  of a typical Knoxville Klansman  is based upon 
three primary parameters—occupation,   residence and church 
affiliation.     Yet  even in this  case,   the  size  of the  sample 
(350)  was only a fraction of the Elans'   strength in Knoxville 
The unusually lengthy list of Buffalo Klansmen  con- 
tained 3,884 names,   primarily from western New York.-5 
Buffalo residents numbered 1,822 (47.03$).     Although most 
of the  3,884 entries include occupational information,   only 
the majority of Buffalo entries include  exact   street 
addresses.     This  analysis,   therefore,   will  concern only 
those   1,82° names. 
Blue-collar workers comprised approximately 60 per 
cent of Buffalo's labor force in the 1320's while an addi- 
tional 20  per cent were lower-level white-collar workers. 
The figures Jackson presented indicate that 64.4 
per cent  of Aurora's Klansmen"and 60.8 per cent   in Chicago 
were  white-collar workers which contradicts all available 
evidence  on the nature of the Klan's appeal. 
-^Expose*  of Traitors   in  the   Interests  of Jews, 
Catholics.   Negroes  and All  Respecters  of  the  American  Prin- 
ciple   of  Civil  and Religious  Freedom. 
4Edwin Powell,   The  Design of Discord   (New  York: 
Oxford University Press,   1S70J,   p.   ej. 
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An occupational breakdown of the local Klan's membership 
indicated that   involvement of a cross-section of society. 
Mechanics,   bakers,   butchers,   physicians,   clergymen,   con- 
tractors,  machinists,   salesmen,   and one State assemblyman 
joined.    The majority (62.16$)were blue-collar workers, 
with unskilled laborers the largest group (10.66$).     Sales- 
men (7.87$)   comprised the largest group among white-collar 
workers (34.66$).5 
That the majority of members were blue-collar 
workers is not   surprising,   since the recent  immigrant 
competed primarily with this group for employment.     The 
Klan offered a solution to the alien's economic challenge 
by calling for quota restrictions.    Moreover,   the Klan's 
robes  and orders of membership appealed to many in lower 
socio-economic and educational levels.     The robes  identified 
the Klan as a separate group in society dedicated to pre- 
serving the   status quo while  the  orders  of membership  served 
the  same motivational function as medals and ribbons, 
rewarding active members and inspiring them to a deeper 
commitment.     The need for peer group recognition is often 
greater  if  one's   job   or social  position  fails   to  elicit 
respect.     As  Y/izards,   Goblins,  Dragons,   Titans,   Cyclops, 
Hydras,   and Furies in command of Empires,  Somains,   Realms, 
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TABLE  3 
'iVhite-Collar Klansmen 
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Provinces, and Klans, many achieved the recognition they 
desired.  The Elan's titles and vocabulary created a 
mystical impression similar to that of a religious cult and 
hinted at a medieval origin, when the chivalry of knights 
protected the weal: and oppressed.  Perhaps more important^', 
the terms connoted an image of awesome uncontrollable power 
and terror.  Conversely, parades, cross burnings, picnics, 
weddings, Klonklaves, and the more mundane biweekly meetings, 
provided members with an opportunity to socialize, discuss 
local conditions, and decide upon a course of remedial 
action.  Lonely men could find companionship; frustrated 
men could articulate their grievances. 
Some merchants, contractors, doctors, insurance 
agents, and druggists probably joined for economic reasons. 
Klansmen in every locality received lists of local business- 
men who were either fellow Knights or sympathizers with 
instructions to patronize their shops.  Indeed one of the 
primary characteristics which distinguished the Klan of 
the 1920's from its Reconstruction predecessor was the 
prevalence of the profit motive.  Prom Imperial Wizards  ■ 
Simmons and Evans down to local leaders, the profit 
potential was a significant factor. 
6HPnrv P Fry discusses the importance of the 
Elan's rhetoric is similar. 
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While occupational information indicates that the 
Klan appealed to all groups except the very wealthy, 
residential information indicates a number of determinants 
which partially accounted for Klan membership. Proximity 
to the Slavic community in the northwestern section of the 
city, to the Italian community on the West Side, to blacks 
in the central city, or to Polonia on the East Side, made 
n 
the immigrant-radical threat more immediate.  Nearness to 
minority concentrations, however, fails to explain the large 
number of Klansmen in the northern and southeastern areas 
of the city.  Second- and third-generation immigrants lived 
throughout the area but, due to normal assimilative 
processes, they projected a low profile. 
Nor does a comparison of the number of Klansmen 
in the areas which supported Mayor Buck or Frank Schwab 
in the 1921 election provide a complete answer since the 
number in each area is approximately the same.5 The number 
of Klansmen who lived near the ward lines where the vote 
split is significant since their minority position was more 
painfully obvious. The results in the fifth ward, where 
Schwab won by only 260 votes, could have influenced some 
to foresee an electoral reversal in 1925 if Schwab's adminis- 
tration could have been discredited. 
?See Figure 2 on page 45-  The map is based upon 
the available residential information for 1708 Buffalo 
Klansmen. 
8See Figure 3 on page 46. 
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Figure 2 
Comparison of Ethnic Concentrations 
and Klan Membership 
Poles V///\ 
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Figure 3 
Comparison of 1921 Election Results 
and Klan Membership 
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Ten Klansmen = • 
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Peer group influence appears to be another signifi- 
cant determinant. Twelve physicians, three of whom had 
offices at 633 Main Street and two at 494 Franklin Street, 
joined the Klan; three veterinarians who shared office 
soacc at 455 Ellicott Street were members; and two of three 
Klan undertakers managed a funeral home at 463 William 
Street.  This same pattern is evident among insurance 
agents and store clerks. Political discussions during 
the normal course of work or while eating lunch encouraged 
a shared perception of societal problems. 
Family influence is also a powerful force in molding 
men's opinions.  Since biographical information is available 
for very few Klansmen, family relationships have been deter- 
mined by examining the membership list for identical 
surnames residing at the same address or within a few 
dwelling units of each other. Twenty family pairings of 
two or three people have been discovered, accounting for 
forty-two people. The extent of family influence probably 
exceeded that indicated by the twenty pairings. 
The influence of the Crusading Ministers on their 
congregations was also immense. Littleton E. H. Smith, 
Robert MacAlpine, Chester Cowardline, Charles Penfold, 
and Robert Doherty, continually spoke of public morality, 
prohibition, and Schwab's refusal to enforce the laws. 
Smith was the most successful in uniting people to oppose 
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evil influences in the city.y Hundreds attended Sunday 
night services at the Ontario Street Presbyterian Church 
to listen to Smith's sermons on temperance and sin.  Praised 
for his fearless stand for justice and his quiet and sincere 
nature, the "Crusading Minister" was admired by most of his 
parishioners, some of whom were Klansmen.  Only twelve mem- 
bers of his flock are identifiable from a comparison of 
fragmentary parish records with fifty-one Klansmen from the 
church area, yet his influence appears to have been immensely 
greater since many from all section of the city attended his 
10 
sermons without officially joining the parish. '  The primary 
bond which united those who listened to Smith's sermons was 
temperance rather than theology.  Smith was intensely 
interested in preserving a dry city through his work in the 
Christian Endeavor Movement, the Klan, and the Buffalo Council 
9See Figure 4 on page 49. Both Smith and Cowardline 
were Klansmen while Penfold refused the Klan's offer to join. 
DoSerty'xpressed his desire to join but "as born in Canada 
and therefore ineligible.  The influence of the clergy in 
Indianapolis was also great.  See Jackson, p. 15U. 
10Smith preferred to work in his home rather than 
the parish office! Consequently, when his home was bombed 
in\lrll  lc-24 (see pp. 55-56), most of the parish records 
all of whom still live *» B^gJ[0^.  "Ontario Street and his activity under anjconditior;s>  20_ig2g „ 
Presbyterian Church Communicant Book, 1J^ MW>. 
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Figure 4 
Comparison of Crusading Ministers' 
Churches and Klan Membership 
1 - Smith 
2 - Cowardline 
3 - MacAlpine 
4 - Penfold 
5 - Doherty 
- Ten Klansmen 
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of Churches'   Social Services Committee.11 
The activity of the Protestant ministers   in the 
Klan  implicated the  Buffalo  Council of Churches   in the 
organization's success.    Robert Moats Miller has   studied 
the  connection between the Klan and national Protestant 
religious  bodies.     He  concludes  that,   although many local 
ministers supported the Klan, at no time did the Protestant 
press or convocations approve of or support the Klan.   In 
fact,   he  has  found  criticism to  be  more   common than pre- 
viously thought. Circumstantial evidence  available 
concerning the relationship between the Buffalo Klan and 
the   churches indicates that on the local level,   the churches 
were  more  involved  in  the  Klan's  growth than Miller would be 
willing to  admit.13     Smith  assumed leadership of  the  Council's 
Social  Services  Committee   in early  1924 and  transformed  it 
into a direct action group.    At the same time, he  led 
i:LInterview with Reverend Albert Kunz, Pastor of 
the Riverside United Presbyterian Church (formerly the 
Ontario Street Presbyterian Church),  October Zd,   ±j(±. 
12Robert Moats Miller,   "Note on the Relationship 
between the Protestant  Churches  and the  Revived KuLlux 
Klan,"  Journal  of  Southern History,  XXII  (August   1956), 
PP.   355^36^: 
13U:,f0rtunately,   the Council's "
cord^^^tl" 
1925  and offered no  indication of its action before that 
date5,   larrf 11 also supplemented Miller-,s £«*«•£ *%** 
he failed to discover any instances of P"*^ ™Pp?r* t?La 
the Plan amonr the Protestant leaders or press in Louisiana. 
Harreir^sented evidence that  -me found ^HlSeS, 
between the  Church and the  Klan  "notorious.        bee  iiarrexi, 
pp.   266-292. 
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Klansmen on Saturday night roadhouse raids. The change to 
direct action in both cases was partially due to Smith's 
zeal and it is conceivable, though impossible to prove, 
that the same people assisted him in both raiding parties. 
The Council's failure to criticize the Klan, before or 
after Smith admitted his Knighthood, is also significant. 
The interrelationship between the Klan and the Anti- 
Saloon League is more obvious.  The League coordinated 
activities among various prohibition groups, the Protestant 
Churches and the political parties. Although State Superin- 
tendent William Anderson denied he was a Klansman, he 
believed the Klan was "a necessary arm of the Protestant 
war versus evil."14 Both the Klan and the League viewed 
prohibition as the panacea for Buffalo's moral ills and 
Schwab's reluctance to enforce the laws as a direct threat 
to the goal of a "clean city."  The mutual verbal support, 
common perception of societal problems, and common goal, 
indicated that they probably drew support from the same 
elements. 
Local determinants and resonance to the immigrant- 
radical  stereotype increased individual susceptibility to 
Klan propaganda which re-enforced local fears.     In one 
14 iiffRlo Exwress,  October 6,   1923,  p.   9. 
15Evidence of cooperation between the League and 
the Klan in iSta also  exists.     See Jackson,   p.   31. 
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pamphlet  published in 1923,   Imperial Wizard Hiram Evans 
stated his views on immigration.     He  believed the   "broad 
spread of anarchist  sentiment brought  to    America by 
diseased and festered sinners of despoiled and broken 
Europe"   threatened the nation's democratic future.     Medi- 
terranean and Central Europeans accepted unskilled  jobs 
for lower wages than native whites thus limiting the "100^ 
American's"  ability to find employment.     He viewed the 
alien's refusal to assimilate as even more menacing 
since Anglo-conformity was a fundamental of liberty.16 
During the four years before the pamphlet became available 
to  Buffalo Klansmen,   the   local   press   depicted  immigrants 
as Bolsheviks  who  refused  to  educate   their "children 
according to American standards  or to  purchase homes in 
the community"  and who had demonstrated a "reactionary, 
17 barbarian  instinct   for disorganization  and  destruction." 
In another pamphlet,  Evans warned that the Roman Catholic 
Church encouraged naturalized immigrants to vote as a 
block.1       Schwab's  opponents were well  aware  of  the   fact 
that many of the mayor's  supporters were Catholic. 
l6Hiram W.   Evans,   The Attitude  of the Knights of 
the  ICu Klux Klan Toward  Immigration     (Atlanta:   19257, 
17Buffalo Commercial,   Seotember 20,   1919,   p.   4; 
Buffalo  E^rcr-c,  July  7,   1^'2  to  October  5,   1922. 
18 livans 
klux Klan Toward 
1923),   pp.  1-5. 
Svans,  The Attitude   of the  Knights  of  the  Ku 
Co ard EEi  ??nma.r.  Catholic  Hierarchy  (Atlanta: 
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The analysis of Buffalo's Klansmen indicates a 
number of determinants which increased individual suscepti- 
bility to Klan propaganda.  An individual joining the Klar. 
was likely to be a supporter of Mayor Buck, live near an 
ethnic concentration or knew someone who did, and attend 
a church where sermons were preached on temperance, sin 
and public morality. Perhaps more important, he probably 
knew or worked with a Klansman before he joined the movement 
and he almost certainly perceived societal problems in a 
stcreotypic manner similar to that of the Anti-Saloon 
League and Buffalo Council of Churches' Social Services 
Committee.  He was definitely a prohibitionist who favored 
social conformity and feared the destructive effects of 
cospolitanism.  Above all else, he was an average citizen 
i was concerned with a decline in public morality and 
committed to preservation of the statue quo. 
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CHAPTER IV 
"EXPOS^ OF  TRAITORS" 
Nationally,   the Klan experienced a dramatic decline 
in membership during 1524.     Tensions released by World 
War I and the Red Scare subsided;   immigration restrictions 
and increased prosperity made the  immigrant-radical threat 
seem less tenable.     In addition,  the much-publicized Klan- 
initiated violence which occurred in Louisiana and Oklahoma 
rcrved to  discredit the  organization's expressed ideals. 
Locally,   disillusionment with the  secret  order was in large 
part  due to other factors.     Criticism of the Klan in the 
local press and from religious groups was mounting.     The 
climax occurred in Buffalo when a single act of Elan-initiated 
violence and a series of scandals transformed the Klan's 
image from that of a fraternal organization concerned with 
.lie morality to that  of a vindictive and violent group 
of adulterers and thieves.     In short,  the public's mood 
changes drastically in the two years after Kleagle 
Mitchell announced a membership drive  in Buffalo. 
An alteration of the  public's perception of the 
immigrant  and his role  in American  society was evident  in 
the Buffalo press by 1924.     The period of Klan growth 
followed closely after articles and editorials depicting 
55 
the immigrant as an immoral, violent drunk v.'ho attempted 
to control the community's destiny by electing a "wet" 
mayor.  The violent strikes of 191S and 1922, the election 
of 1922, and the vice scandal in the same year, had increased 
public awareness of societal problems while an emotional 
editorial response to those events heightened ptiblic suscep- 
tibility to Klan propaganda. During 1923, however, criticism 
of the Klan replaced immigrant scare stories. Violence, 
once an alien trait, became associated with the southern 
and western Ivlans. Thus, the Buffalo press seemed to be 
in tactic agreement with the Saturda;, Evening Post which 
dismissed earlier concern over a largely mythical immigrant- 
radical threat as "nothing but the last symptom of war 
fever." 
Old stereotypes were resurrected occasionally. 
One   such lapse  followed the bombing of Littleton Smith's 
hone by four unidentified men.     Although the explosion 
destroyed the minister's home and damaged neighboring 
structures,   no   one was  killed  or  injured.     Smith was 
returning from a meeting in another section of the  cit 
(possibly a Klan meeting)  and his family,   fearful of 
Previous threats by the -Black Hand," was staying with 
friends.     Federal  investigators,   fearing the act was the 
first  of a series against  prohibitionists,   searched the 
le^„n. ^inrl'ort, March 22,   1S24,   p.   28. 
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wreckage for  clues and guarded the homes of Charles Penfold 
2 and Robert  Doherty. 
Public reaction was  swift and emotional.    The 
Express blamed Schwab's permissiveness for creating the 
climate  in which individuals would seriously contemplate 
violence.     "The outrage,"  the paper stated,   "was another 
startling climax in the  crime wave which has so long dis- 
graced the  community  (an<j|   may well spur both public 
opinion and the authorities to sterner resolution."       The 
Commercial  condemned the act  in the same rhetoric used to 
criticize the  1922   streetcar strike. 
What a heinous  crime'.     It must necessarily 
be  laid at the  doors of the wets,  who have 
felt the  effects of the minister's activities 
for the  enforcement  of the Volstead law.     It 
was their way of revenging themselves.     Their 
rage  carried them beyond all bounds and their 
crimiral and murderous minds conceived the 
idea of making the  enemy pay with his own life 
and the lives  of his wife and children. 
No matter what the average citizen's 
attitude  is towards the wet and dry issue or 
the part the Rev. Mr.   Smith has played in 
recent  raids or whether he is a member of the 
Ku Klux Klan,   he cannot but denounce the 
perpetrators  of last night's outrage.     It was 
the*diabolical work of inhuman and diseased 
1SThe minds of the bootleggers and their 
ilk who  planned the attack are of the  same 
Sece  of minds of the  arch criminals who  set 
the ex°losVon that wrecked the Niagara Palls 
highspeed train line at Elmwood during the 
street   carmen's strike.4 
2tt„ffm.o  Express,   April  18  and  19,   1924. 
3Ibid.     April 19,   1924,   p.   6. 
4ft,ffain nnnmercial,  April 18,   1924,  p.   4. 
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A public meeting, called by the Council of Churches, 
supported Smith's prohibition activity and demanded that 
city officials take prompt, stem action to enforce all 
laws.  Pour thousand people attended and threatened to 
request the mayor's impeachment if he failed to implement 
speedy and constant police action to arrest all lawbreakers. 
The "drys" had a new issue; the press resurrected 
an old stereotype.  Yet, except for the mass meeting, calm 
prevailed. The direct action techniques of Smith and the 
Klan produced criticism in the press and a split among 
the crusading ministers. 
Events during the summer forced the Klan to test 
the public's disillusionment with violent tactics.  The 
K. 3. Adsign Company, a facade for the local Klan, reported 
in July 1924 the theft of a mailing list and 0250.  Two 
weeks later the mayor received a letter reportedly written 
by a dissident Batavia Klansman which offered to sell the 
list for 0200.  Although the money was never paid, an 
alleged telephone tip led police to a number of file boxes 
in the basement of the Calumet Building where the Klan 
rented office space.  District Attorney Guy P. Moore, a 
prohibitionist, ordered the police to return the boxes to 
their legal owner.  But Mayor Schwab, envisioning a dif- 
ferent role for the list, offered the names to any paper 
which would publish them.  No paper, however, would assume 
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the responsibility for publication since   it was impossible 
to verify that the  1,752  individuals listed were Klansmen. 
But   published or unpublished,   the list was the 
object   of  intense   interest.     Hundreds swarmed into police 
headquarters to see  if suspected employees, neighbors or 
friends  were  Knights.     On August  14,   3,000  people   expressed 
their desire  to examine the list.    Many of those listed 
denied affiliation with the Elan,   charging that Mayor 
Schwab desired to discredit their prohibition activity; 
others admitted a prior connection but stated that they 
quit after learning of the Klan1s true nature.    People 
boycotted Klan businesses;   employers dismissed individuals 
whose names appeared on the list;  and one  individual, many 
believed,   committed suicide after killing his wife  and two 
sons rather  than  face  his  friends.5    The  police  withdrew 
the list  from public view due to the unmanageable  crowds, 
large   anti-Klan demonstrations  in  south Buffalo,   and the 
bombing of  a   crusading minister's home  in Niagara Falls. 
Five  days  later,   when  a  second  list   containing the  names 
of 1,937 Buffalo residents and 2,088  individuals from 
5See   the  Buffalo,  Commercial,   August  7  and  8,   1524. 
Henry H.   Lyln ^. electrieal -gf eer    was operate^on for 
an enlarged tnyroxd gland in 1.04.    M      ^^ to 
autopsy indicated that a vlJJJ»*  before caused a state of 
p.   174. 
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surrounding areas became available, access was limited to 
reporters. A court battle eventually opened the list for 
public viewing. 
It  is   impossible  to determine how Samuel M.  Pleisch- 
mann,   a local publisher,   obtained 3.884 of the names which 
he published in pamphlet   form in September.    But  publish 
them he did and copies,   available at news stands and on 
street   corners,   were  clearly best  sellers.     Delighted with 
the  success of this  initial venture,   Pleischmann offered 
$3,000  to  anyone  who   could  provide  the  names  of  the 
additional  3,000 Klansmen he believed lived in Buffalo. 
His  offer went  unaccepted perhaps because of fear of 
reprisals,   or because a list of such length did not  exist. 
Even before  publication,  the release of the lists 
removed the protection offered by Klan hoods.     Hidden 
behind masks,  Klansmen were able to enter churches,   raid 
roadhouses,   and   intimidate   individuals  without   fear  of 
identification   or the  disapproval  of employers,   friends 
or family.     The   prospect   of being attacked by a hooded 
Klansman without  the  benefit  of  legal   recourse   increased 
the Klan-s fear-producing potential.     But without  the 
6Availa,le infectionJ^^*^™ 
3,689 Buffalo Klansmen.     Jac-on . *?        opinion rather 
members appears to be te f " °"S'°presE    r the available than  on the   information  in  the  loca    P accurate 
list.     Pour thousand members would be a m 
estimate.     See Jackson,   p.   W- 
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zirotection of hoods,   individuals became  susceptible to 
the onus the organization acquired by 1924. 
Many Klansmen believed the breach of Klan secrecy 
required punishment.     The lives of Mayor Schwab and his 
family were repeatedly threatened.     Although the mayor 
initially dismissed the threats as the work of cranks, 
additional security officers were assigned to guard his 
house.8    The real victim of Klan wrath,  however,  was not 
Schwab but the Klansman who gave the list to the mayor in 
the first  place.     The   chief suspect was Edward Obertean who 
joined the Klan in 1922 when he was  still a member of the 
Buffalo Police Department.    Although officially removed 
from the  payroll  in 1923,  he was assigned as a special 
undercover  agent  under a Deputy Police  Commissioner  charged 
with the responsibility of ridding the  city of the Klan. 
Obertean's fear of Klan revenge increased steadily,   reaching 
a peak in late August when he was called a traitor at a 
Klan meeting. 
In  order  to  determine  Obertean-s   complicity,   Thomas  H. 
Austin,   a North  Carolina Klan  investigator,  arrived  in Buffalo 
7A similar occurren^e^ontributed to t^declxn^of 
SSlSSS^e'SaS^iraf K™?* Li Jaison,   pp.   104 
and 125. 
R *   ^,,r.+ oP.    1024.  D.   14;   September 14, <Wfa1o  Express,   August  2b,   W»i   P-     "M 
1924,   sec.   B,   ?•   -!•• 
Number  227,   it   is  safe  to  assume  ne   j 
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during the third week of August.  On August 31, a confron- 
tation occurred.  Austin and Carl Sturm, a local Klansman, 
met at the home of Buffalo Kleagle George C. Bryant and 
the three drove through the Kensington Avenue section of 
the city until Austin noticed Obertean's automobile.  A 
long chase ensued. Finally Obertean stopped and jumped 
out of his car.  Sturm and Bryant leaped from their car 
as Obertean fired the first of nine shots exchanged between 
the men.  Obertean and Austin died immediately and Bryant 
was seriously wounded. 
Buffalo was shocked.  The Express compared the 
double murder with memories of the v/est and south during 
the 1860's.11 The Courier recounted the progression of 
ELan violence from the southwest to the northeast and 
pleaded "in the name of common sense" that the country 
"be rid of the KKK so that law may be enforced by the 
duly designated individuals."12 The Evening News compared 
the Klan to the Know-Nothing Party of the 1950's which 
attempted to "poison American ideals and political framework" 
and expressed confidence that the assassination would mark 
10For the best information on the event, see the 
Buffalo Express, September 1 to 5, 1924. 
11Ibid.  September 2, 1524, p. 8. 
12v,nffP..lo  Courier, September 3, 1924, p. 6. 
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the  passing of the Klan from Buffalo. The Buffalo 
Volksfreund was   equally  confident   concerning the  Klan's 
demise  while  the  Dziennik Dla-V/szystkich  did not   express 
an opinion,   possibly for fear of reprisals. 
The  assassination alone might  not  have  been suffi- 
cient  to  totally  discredit  the  organization had  it  not 
been for other events which re-enforced the  public's dis- 
illusionment with the Klan.     A police  officer arrested 
Arthur C.   Acker,   an admitted Klansman, for illegally 
15 selling contraceptives  in Buffalo.   y    Another officer 
noticed a parked  car along a lonely portion of Delavan 
Road.  He arrested the  couple   in the front  seat for 
"outraging public decency."    The two people  identified 
themselves as Reverent  Charles Penfold and his wife. 
Four days later,   however,   Freda Lohr,   a married mother 
of three  and a choir member in Penfold's  congregation, 
confessed  that   she was  with the minister and would  plead 
guilty  in   court.     After admitting his  guilt,   Penfold was 
sentenced to thirty days  in  jail as 800 people  stood outside 
13Buffalo  Evening News,   September  1,   1924,   p.   8; 
September  16,   1CJ24,   p.   8. 
14Buffalo  Volksfreund,   September 4,   1924,   p.   4. 
15Huffalo  Express,   September  2,   1924,   p.   1.     A Butfglo  "*?*    , -'.^anta when a Klansman  was similar event   occurred  in Atlanta WM« 
 4-r.A   -P^^  flnrnken  driving.     See  Jackson,   p.   J*. arrested for drunken ri i . 
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the courthouse jeering and booing. To make matters worse, 
six Klansmen protested the trial by burning crosses and 
stopping cars near the spot where the police arrested 
Penfold. Compounding their mistake, Smith and other Klan 
leaders protested what they perceived as police prosecution 
of prohibitionists.   Smith made a similar error in judg- 
ment when he arrested two suspected drug smugglers in late 
Se-itember and presented the evidence to the police after 
briefing a number of reporters.  Chemical analysis of the 
seized "opium" indicated that it was baking powder. Although 
Smith may have been the victim of a deliberate attempt at 
deception, his reputation never recovered.   An official 
investigation of Klan finances proved more damaging than 
the actions of individuals associated with the secret order. 
The District Attorney's office discovered the misappropria- 
tion of over 520,000 in initiation dues by Klan leaders. 
Public disillusionment with the Klan was not solely 
due to its newly acquired image as a group of violent-prone, 
adulterous, swindling individuals.  Prohibition failed to 
16 Buffalo Exprgj ;.  September 20 to 28, 1924. 




dues  wa 
64 
achieve any positive results.     Bootleggers prospered almost 
everywhere and Canadian liquor sold well   in the north.     The 
number of individuals arrested in Buffalo  for public intoxi- 
cation between 1923 and 1933 never fell below 10,000,   a 
slight  increase  compared with the annual  figures for 1919- 
1922."*"'    The  extent  of the  problem remained constant while 
the public's  concern declined.    Legislation was  ineffective 
except where rigorous enforcement remained constant.     In the 
final analysis,   the  coercive methods of the prohibitionists 
accomplished little that was beneficial to the   cause. 
A larger problem,   inherent to movements for social 
control,   also had an effect.     Born in fear,  the Klan defined 
societal problems  in demagogic and conspiratorial terms. 
Its  "aggressively moralistic  stance"   depicted  good and  evil 
in absolute  terms requiring immediate action without 
reflection.     As time passed,  many businessmen and profes- 
sionals,   who were normally the first to respond to Klan 
membership drives,   defected due to the Elan's violence, 
blatant bigotry and the opposition of many in positions of 
authority.     Many of those  in lower-level   socio-economic 
groups remained in the organization since,   as a group, 
they tend to  exhibit a greater tendency toward "ethnic 
^Buffalo Police Department,  Reports,   1915-1933- 
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prejudice,   political authoritarianism and chiliastic 
Of) 
transvaluational  religion."   '     A social application of 
Gresham's lav/ applied.     As more lower-class individuals 
joined,  more   socially prominent individuals defected;   and 
as the   socially prominent defected, the more militant 
lower-level  groups achieved greater control thus forcing 
more businessmen and professionals to defect.    The Klan's 
appeal  to "true believers" was its greatest source of 
strength and its greatest weakness. 
20, *   «.* RPBh    n.   117;   Seymour Martin Lipset, 
Sociological  Review,  XXIV  [.Augu.^  ±;JJJ,   VV 
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CONCLUSION 
An examination of a social movement in a limited 
georgraphic context  should afford an opportunity to offer 
generalizations about the broader movement  providing 
evidence  for  common characteristics as well as those which 
ere  unique.     An  examination  of the  Klan in Buffalo  provides 
just   such an opportunity.     The local response to Klan 
appeals and actions,   the use of persuasive tactics,   and 
the  change  to   coercion and violence which resulted in a 
decline in membership,  were typical of Klan activity 
elsewhere.     Indeed,   there  is reason to believe that Pro- 
visional Klan Number 5 better typified the movement than 
more active  local Klans which have received greater 
attention   due   to  their violent  nature  or  intense  political 
activity.     More  important,   its membership conforms to the 
wide   social cross-section which historians have assumed 
to be  the basis  of Klan support.    But whereas previous 
studies have  offered no substantial supportive  evidence- 
the  statistics   in Kenneth Jackson's study of the urban 
Klan are fragmentary at best-analyses of Buffalo Klansmen 
provided the kind of extensive and reliable information that 
transforms assumptions into hard evidence. 
i co fii    108,   114,   11S-120,  153 ^■Sce  Jackson,   pp.   62-63,   -W&,   "■■»• 
and 225. 
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The members of Buffalo's Klan were average  citizens 
from every section of society.     Their perception of societal 
problems conformed with the views presented by the Klan 
even before  Klan organizers arrived in the city.    At no 
time  did the Klan create public susceptibility to  its 
appeals but   it did accentuate  individual resonance. 
The   evidence of peer group,   family and clerical 
influence adds measurably to our understanding of individual 
motivation.     Simply stating that personal resonance to 
prevalent  stereotypes or Klan propaganda influenced con- 
cerned  citizens to   join the Klan fails to  consider individual 
socialization and  its impact on decisions.     In his  study of 
the Louisiana Klan,  Kenneth Harrell mentions the existence 
of numerous local Klan charter membership lists which 
indicate that  the Klan attempted to recruit  "substantial 
people   in the   community"   in its initial membership drives. 
Some  of those  lists are from small towns and rural areas 
which tend to  exhibit a higher degree of interpersonal 
contacts than urban areas.     A close  examination of such 
lists may indicate further evidence of peer group,   family 
and clerical   influence which contributed to an individual's 
susceptibility to Klan propaganda. 
on 
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The role of the press, especially the local press, 
and its relationship with public susceptibility to Klan 
appeals needs to be emphasized for it was a significant 
factor in the Klan's Buffalo success. The importance of 
publicity given the Klan by the New York V/orld1 s expose, 
Congressional hearings and local papers in the Southwest 
and Indiana is widely accepted.  In each case, the Klan 
was given a public forum to present its views, annource its 
activities, and call for support. Its success war- partially 
dependent on its ability to thus sensitize the public to 
its existence and its solutions to societal problems. 
The impact of the Buffalo press was qualitatively 
different.  The papers helped to create an immigrant-radical 
stereotype which stirred a number of Protestant ministers 
to form committees to enforce public morality before Klan 
organizers arrived and skillfully incited public fears. 
Ironically, the Commercial, which vehemently opposed the 
Klan, was probably most responsible for the creation of the 
stereotype.  Nor were national publications blameless.  The 
Spt»HBv Kvenin, Post published Kenneth Roberts- nativist 
articles which characterized eastern and southern Europeans 
3See Harrell, P. 153, g^i^S*'^*^ 
sity, 1966), PP. 111-112. 
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as drunken,   shiftless,  violent individuals and called for 
immigration restrictions.    The link between exclusion of 
would-be  immigrants and social control of those already  in 
this  country was implied.    The creation of the stereotype 
resulted in the establishment of precursor groups of the 
Klan which further increased public susceptibility. 
The   cress possessed the  power to promote as well as 
discredit  the Klan.     In Atlanta,   Louisville, Memphis and 
Buffalo,  anti-Klan editorials affected the public's  opinion 
of the  organization.     The  change  in editorial policy away 
from the alien threat to an outspoken anti-Klan stance not 
only made  it   increasingly difficult to recruit additional 
members  in Buffalo  but  also  limited the  Klan's  ability  to 
retain the   support   it possessed.     Immigrants no longer 
constituted  the   primary threat  to   social  stability.     Violent 
Klan activities  in Louisiana and Oklahoma caused many people 
to view the  Klan as  a personification  of violence-prone 
radicals who,   they believed,   threatened American life in 
the early 1920's.     In contrast,   press  support  of the Klan's 
opposition to  Governor John C.  Walton in Oklahoma was a 
~iificant  factor in its success in state politics, 
addition  to   promoting the  Klan's  activities,   various  Oklahoma 
/ , «,    i^«_i^o.  also see Jackson,   pp.  43» 
Alexander,   PP.  J3°:1^ti-Klan editorials. 47 and 87 for the impact  of anti-Klan ea 
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papers condoned and supported the Klan's goals. That 
support tended to silence hesitant critics as well as 
influence many to   join the movement. 
Those   in positions of authority or influence had 
an impact  similar to that  of the press.     In Atlanta,   Dallas, 
Tulsa,  Memphis,   and Portland,  Oregon,  the police openly 
sympathized with the Klan and ignored illegal Klan acts 
and anti-Elan   complaints.5    This hesitancy of the police 
to  enforce the   laws against the Klan allowed greater 
nobility in an area and relative freedom of action.     Public 
ceremonies and   demonstrations would be tacitly,   if not 
officially,   sanctioned.    The lack of support in city hall 
and in Buffalo's police department  is,   therefore,   extremely 
significant.     Every roadhouse raid occurred outside the 
city limits where   Schwab lacked  jurisdiction and where 
town police lacked the necessary manpower to combat  the 
secret  order.     The Klan was forced to bypass the more 
notable  examples of prohibition violations and vice   con- 
ditions  in the   core area and  concentrate on less serious 
instances.    Their level of success was thereby limited. 
in other areas of the country,   support  from those 
in positions of authority assisted the Klan's search for 
recruits.     Henry Ford's anti-Jewish and anti-immigrant 
views were well known in the Detroit area.     Humors persisted 
* -v.* p.ph    t>    124;   Jackson,   p.   38,  and ^Lircset   and RaaD,   p.   ±«*M 
llexander,   pp.   67 and 150. 
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prior to 1925 that Ford offered the Klan financial support. 
Whether or not he was a Klansman is not  important.    That 
many people  associated his views with those of the Klan is. 
That   association  influenced many to   join the Klan  since 
they were able to  perceive the organization as respectable. 
On the other hand,  no respected businessman or official 
of Ford's stature  openly supported or was associated with 
the Klan in Buffalo.     Many individuals who agreed with the 
Klan's goals but  questioned the wisdom of its acts might 
have   decided to   join  if  they  could have  identified the  Klan 
with a person whom they respected.     Thus without the support 
of men of authority or influence,   the Buffalo Klan's 
success was limited to  its ability to   sensitize and influence 
the opinions of potential members in an area.    The absence 
of support   or active  criticism made that task more difficult. 
As the opinions of prominent  individuals had an 
impact  upon Klan  success,   so  too,   the   size  of the  local Klan 
and the number of potential members in an area was a deter- 
minant   in  the  type  and  extent   of  activity.     In northern 
Louisiana where  parishes were  predominantly Protestant, 
the Klan was relatively powerful and active while  in pre- 
dominantly Catholic southern Louisiana,   the Klan experienced 
problems in recruiting members.7     Similarly,   in predominantly 
6Jackson,   pp.   127,   142 and 274. 
Wrell,   PP.   120,   and 268-279- 
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Catholic Buffalo,   the Klan recruited approximately nine 
per cent  of the potential membership pool by 1924 and 
prospects  for further growth were probably limited. 
Although the  change  in tactics in 1924 was largely dependent 
upon a leadership decision and the absence of positive 
accomplishments,   it  is also possible that local leaders 
believed the Klan was no longer capable of growth. 
Coercion under these  circumstances would not alienate any 
potential   converts and v/ould probably strengthen the  commit- 
ment  of many in the  organization. 
Even if this relatively small pool of potential 
members is  considered,   the  extent of activity and violence 
was  extremely low in comparison to more notable  examples 
in the south and west.    Klan violence in Louisiana occurred 
in small towns and farmlands which tend to exhibit a higher 
level of concern over social morality.5     In Williamson 
County,   Illinois,   for instance,  the pattern of Klan 
violence was an extension of an accepted vigilante tradition 
whieh continued into the period of gang warfare  in the 1930' s 
3y the  same  token,   Klan violence in Tulsa was typical of 
that   city's  "sordid history of violence" which included 
8This figure is based upon the  estimation of 4-,000 
Buffalo Klaismen°    The number of whitenative.males over 
twenty-one  years  of  age,  with native  Parentage,   was  appr 
ximately 45,000  in  1924.     See  Fonrteentn Oengag   ol  tne 
United  5tat«R|   1Q20;   Population,   III,   ?•   !»*• 
Wrell,   PP.  268-279. 
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lynching,   race  riots and vigilantism. The fraternal 
nature of the Buffalo Klan is therefore typical of most 
local Klans where traditions of violent  social  control 
were absent.     Although many instances of Klan-initiated 
violence  exist  throughout the country,  they seen to be 
smaller in number than one would  expect from a movement 
of the Elan's  size and nature. 
It would be  easy to  condemn the Klan as a violent, 
ultra-conservative,   nativist organization.    Murders, 
lynchings,   and whippings occurred in far too many localities 
and far too  often.     That view, however,  seems overly sim- 
plified when applied to the Klan in Buffalo.     Provisional 
Klan Number  5  grew out of the public's fears and frustrations 
over a decline   in social morality and immigrant activities. 
It was a fraternal organization which attempted to  solve 
the  societal problems its members perceived.     Condemnation 
of its blatant  bigotry would be too easy;  understanding how 
and why Klansmen reacted to  societal strain in certain ways 
is more difficult. 
lOjackson.  P.   85;  Paul Angle,  ^^^^^ 
(New York:   Alfred A. Knopf,   1969   ,   PP-       J ^ number 
be  interesting to compare  lynching statistics i violence. 
of small areas with the instances of Klan initia 
The figures  compiled by ^h^Natl0^p
i
h
i^°CbeJween 1889 and Advancement  of Colored People on J^^6^6^ ^ v;est, 
1918 revealed that 219 people ^"he hands of lynch mobs, and 2,834   in the   south,   died at the hands oi.i,^ ^ ^ 
Georgia,  Mississippi,   f/^orr^Singlv high  in  those  areas, list.     Klan violence was correspondingly g» states, 
1.889-1918    New York:   1919   ,   PP-   ^ * l-int*- before 1920 and of the   cities which experienced race riot-^efwe^J 
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